20¢ APRIL 10, 1950

New Republic

A.N.C.

HAROLD L. ICKES ON: SENATOR McCARTHY

POINT FOUR WHITTLED AWAY

By HELEN FULLER

MENOTTI'S "THE CONSUL"

Reviewed by HAROLD CLURMAN

WHO PREVENTS ATOMIC AGREEMENT?

Part II of a series

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

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New Republic

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WASHINGTON WIRE

At 4:23 in the afternoon of March 27 the five big klieg lights switched on and the six movie cameras on tripods began to whir like crickets as J. Edgar Hoover took the oath and began his testimony. He is a formidable figure, with a round, florid, bulldog face, strong jaw and rather pop eyes. His thick-set torso seems a little out of proportion with his short legs. This is the mysterious head of the FBI testifying in the McCarthy case. We have never had so good a chance to examine him before. He talks fast in a deep, confident voice, obviously a man who may sometimes be wrong but is never in doubt. At 55, his crisp, wavy hair, combed back and held in place by lotion, is hardly touched by gray.

The essence of Hoover's testimony was that FBI files should not be made public to "smear" innocent men. We confess that we were impressed by the way he said it. There was warmth and conviction in his voice. In effect, Hoover damned the whole McCarthy probe.

It was Haldore Hanson's turn next day. He is a State Department official, charged by McCarthy with "a mission to Communize the world." McCarthy charges this former AP correspondent with having been with the Communist armies in China four years, with having written a pro-Communist book on his experiences, and with making pro-Communist policies in the State Department.

Again the crowd leans forward, the six cameras whir, the spotlights beat down pitilessly. McCarthy's charges are all right, it appears, except that it was "four months," not four years; his book (as excerpts show) is a balanced presentation; and he doesn't make State Department policies. Will McCarthy repeat his charges outside the shield of Congressional immunity? Hanson demands. No answer. McCarthy isn't there.

Next scene, the Senate floor last Thursday. The galleries are packed as we have rarely seen them, the corners of the Senate floor crowded with visiting Representatives come to see the big show. The McCarthy documents occupy the tops of two desks and two chairs.

The atmosphere is something to remember. No one who sees this show will ever underestimate young Mr. McCarthy again. He is the most formidable figure to hit the Senate, we think, since Huey Long. He has the galleries with him. The Republicans around him beam. Taft and Bridges exchange enthusiastic smiles as he sidesteps hostile questions again and again. To read what he says in cold print makes the affair look silly, as in one way, of course, it was: his horrendous charge, for instance, that Owen Lattimore carried "two cameras" on a recent trip to Point Barrow, Alaska, and has a home equipped with dark room! But here is a new, coolly calculating Martin Dies, fully aware of what he is doing, gambling for the highest stakes, bold and daring and elusive and slippery and already the darling of the Taft-Wherry-Bridges-Gabrielson forces. It would seem easy to pin down the preposterous utterances, but no; McCarthy is as hard to catch as a mist—a mist that carries lethal contagion.

The atmospherics in Washington, not the mere news and statistics, are often the important thing. On this same day Secretary of State Dean Acheson appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on an important global errand—to launch testimony on Point Four to aid backward nations. Were six tripod movie cameras present? No: this affair rated one. And what a languid, perfunctory matter it was! Hearings started 10 minutes late with three of the 13-man committee present, ultimately raised to four.

Acheson gave a cool, polished performance without the slightest trace of personal warmth. He had been served with a Senate subpoena to produce loyalty files the day before; the House had just passed its leprechaun vote to withhold ECA aid unless Britain "freed" Southern Ireland: perhaps that had taken the heart out of him. The three or four Senators were officially sympathetic,

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actually skeptical. Senator Wiley, McCarthy's not-so-bright colleague from Wisconsin, was shocked to discover a federal insurance scheme to encourage investment in backward countries by guaranteeing private firms against expropriation, plant confiscation and the like. Wiley said he favored Point Four, but thought the government should stay out of "insurance," and that anyway it should have such a tough foreign policy that backward countries wouldn't dare to endanger investments.

Early in May Truman will swing out to the West Coast, stumping the country for a liberal Congress. Much of the punch will go out of his appeal if he signs the anti-consumer Kerr gas bill before he leaves. Passage of this bill is Truman's own fault. It squeaked through the Senate, 44 to 38. It passed the House by two votes. Firm opposition by the President could have overturned these majorities easily. Senate Republicans, significantly, voted 22 to 16 against the bill, grabbing the liberal side from the Democrats. In the House the bill was defeated until four members switched sides. As the four switchers called out the changes, a voice from the floor cried, "How much did you get?" The four were Wilson (R, Ind.), Shafer (R, Mich.), Latham (R, N. Y.) and Moulder (D, Mo.).

Notes. Sir Heneage Ogilvie, noted British surgeon, writing in the conservative British Medical Association's *Medical Journal*, comments on the two Harold Stassen articles (on Britain's national health-insurance program) financed by and appearing in the *Reader's Digest*: "Both articles pay little more than lip service to veracity." . . . Master-economizer Harry F. Byrd voted for the expensive farm-support-subsidy bill after Virginia peanuts had been included. . . . General Ike's testimony for more defense last week virtually ensures against military budget cuts this year. . . . Senator Lodge, as a member of the Tydings five-man committee, will probably vote against McCarthy in the final showdown, leaving McCarthy isolated with Hickenlooper. . . . Ex-Truman adviser Clark Clifford, who abandoned fame for fortune, is cleaning up as Washington's Big Business adviser.

Washington T. R. B.

CORRESPONDENCE

Teller and the Vatican

SIR: I have noticed with dismay the growing tendency of the *New Republic* to imitate the *Nation* in its periodic belching of anti-Catholic venom. . . . Your article, "A Jew Looks at Vatican Policy" (March 13), is too ridiculous to refute with serious argument. . . .

MRS. WILLIAM KAVANAGH
Cincinnati, Ohio

SIR: J. L. Teller's diatribe insults not only the integrity of Catholics but the intelligence of all persons who are able to study problems objectively and without concessions to emotionalism.

MRS. JEROME PITSTICK
South Charleston, Ohio

SIR: On March 13 the *New Republic* published an article entitled "A Jew Looks at Vatican Policy," by J. L. Teller. . . . I am upset by the parochial astigmatism which blinds this writer to what the Vatican is doing on the great world issue of our day: Communism v. the West.

For, I, like Mr. Teller, am a Jew. . . . And when he pleads the special interest of our group against the interest of humanity, he injures me once as a Jew, by giving material to those who would attack us by asserting we pursue selfish ends, and he injures me again as part of humanity.

Though prompted to his writing by "the reascendance of Vatican influence in international affairs," Mr. Teller nowhere acknowledges that it was the fight against Communism which motivated that reascendance. . . . Mr. Teller is only concerned with Vatican policy in international affairs where it affects Zionism or the state of Israel. He doesn't like it. . . . I accord him his right to such an opinion. But I do object to his treating the subject as though it were the sum total of the Vatican's international policy. That is a reprehensible form of special pleading. And I object even more to something else he does.

He is outraged by an example he cites of the National Catholic Welfare Conference using as interchangeable synonyms the terms "Jew" and "Israeli." He is right: the terms are not synonymous. . . . Anyone who uses them interchangeably must either be making an honest mistake, be ignorant of their meanings, or be making vicious propaganda.

What can one think of Mr. Teller then, who would hardly make an error in a matter he considers of such importance and who clearly knows that the terms are not synonymous, when he concludes his article thus: "The Jews feel that implicit in the prospect of Church infringement upon government is the reduction of the margin of their emancipation and equality."

Here is one Jew who doesn't feel that at all. On the contrary, few things would be more desirable in world politics to my mind than the infringement of the Church on the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe and China. . . .

So unless Mr. Teller is prepared to change his sentence to say, "The Jews—with one exception—feel . . . ," he is guilty of the charges he levels against the NCWC. Guiltier, in fact, for in their case there may have been an honest error.

New York City MICHAEL KLEIN

SIR: I am afraid that Mr. Klein was so emotionally upset by the title of my article, "A Jew Looks at Vatican Policy," that he failed to honor it with a careful reading. The issue is not, as Mr. Klein puts it, "Communism v. the West," since Communism is an ideology and the West is a geographical concept. The issue is authoritarianism, whether Communist or any other, v. secular democracy. I readily concede that the confusion and panic in democratic lands, as a consequence of the Communist threat, has provided the opportunity for the reascendance of the Vatican as a political power.

It is not correct that I dealt exclusively with Vatican policy as it affects Zionism or the state of Israel. My article dealt also with the position of the Catholic Church on the admission of *Volksdeutsche* into the US, and on this country's system of education and, albeit briefly, with the intervention of the Catholic hierarchy in West European politics against parties that are themselves opposed to Communism.

Too many Catholic publications in the US have used the terms "Jew" and "Israeli" interchangeably to explain it away as a mere error, and some of them have impugned the allegiance to democracy of American Jews whose position on Jerusalem does not conform with that of the Catholic Church.

The Vatican's position on issues concerning Jews merely complements its position on issues concerning all non-Catholics. . . . However unhappy I may be about Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, I do not envision Europe's salvation in their replacement by theocratic governments. I take this position as an American liberal.

New York City J. L. TELLER

A Correction

Two slips of the pen appeared in our issue of March 20. General Donovan was director of the OSS, not the OWI. The article which mentioned the Shipkov case spoke of both Hungary and Bulgaria; the latter is correct.

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VOLUME 122, NUMBER 15, ISSUE 1845, NEW YORK CITY, APRIL 10, 1950 **New Republic**

WHO PREVENTS ATOMIC AGREEMENT?

IN LAST WEEK'S ISSUE, we discussed the work of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission from its beginning until September 11, 1947. On that date approval was given to the *Second Report* of the UNAEC, the last substantive accomplishment of that body. This *Report* set forth the greater part of the so-called "Majority Plan" which the United Nations Assembly approved about a year later. It is important to note the modifications in the original Baruch Plan and the differences between the majority and minority blocs, differences which essentially remain to this day.

The conclusions of the *Second Report* of the UNAEC were as follows[1]:

International ownership and management. The US-led majority advocated complete international ownership and management of atomic facilities other than mines (which would be internationally licensed, inspected and guarded), and international ownership of fissionables and the source materials from which they come, from the time the ores are mined. In this respect, the *Second Report* reverts to the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and the Baruch Plan, and abandons the half-inspection, half-ownership compromise suggested in the *First Report.* However, the British and French delegations, in effect, entered reservations on this question prior to their favorable vote for the *Report* as a whole.[2] The Soviets were wholly opposed.*

International inspection. The majority proposed a rigorous inspection system, conducted by international personnel, including systematic aerial photographic surveys of certain percentages of every nation's territory each year, ground surveys for raw materials, and inspection of industries making critical components for bombs, reactors, and isotope-separation plants.[3] This represents no essential departure from the Baruch Plan, but the machinery is presented in much more detail. The Soviets advocated international inspection at "periodic intervals" for declared atomic facilities which were to remain under national ownership; and "special investigations" on suspicion of clandestine activities. They proposed also the promulgation of certain mandatory "technical rules of exploitation" by the international commission; these rules might presumably embrace, among others, such things as the design of reactors and a prohibition against large isotope-separation plants. The aim would be to make illegal diversion more difficult and more easily detectable by inspection; this proposal, however, was couched only in the most general terms.

Strategic balance (production quotas). Although this subject was never examined in specific or quantitative terms, certain general principles are discussed and recommended. The majority view reverted to the position of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report in recommending that national production quotas be set in the atomic-control treaty itself rather than left to the discretion of the majority of the International Control Commission.[4] The Baruch Plan had not been clear on this point and could be interpreted as favoring the second alternative.

Some of the most interesting, little noticed, and potentially significant passages of the *Report* relate to production. Various scattered passages suggest that during an initial period of international control, no large-scale production of plutonium be permitted; that only when atomic power is technically and economically feasible shall significant production quotas be permitted—and then only on amendment of the initial basic control treaty.[5]

Thus, almost in a casual way, the majority had come fairly close to accepting the limited-production proposal put forward at various times by a number of persons who had studied the control problem in detail: the physicists

[1]Footnotes giving source references appear on page 10.

*It should be noted that all UN votes on atomic-energy control taken after March 10, 1947, have been officially defined as tentative and preliminary. They are subject to a general reservation—proposed by the US and incorporated by unanimous vote—in a Security Council Resolution of that date; while this resolution referred only to the *First Report* of the UNAEC, it was subsequently construed, in the General Assembly debate in 1948, as applicable to all UNAEC agreements (A/SR/157, p. 8). The language reads: [The Security Council] "recognizes that any agreement expressed by members of the Council to the separate portions of the report is preliminary, since final acceptance of any part by any nation is conditioned on its acceptance of all parts of the control plan in its final form" (Official Records of the Security Council, Second Year, No. 24, also reprinted in the *Second Report* of the UNAEC, pp. 4-5).

This is the second of three articles prepared by the editors of the New Republic, dealing with the greatest single issue of our times: international agreement on atomic energy. The third article, to appear next week, will set forth a group of proposals which in our judgment could serve to break the present deadlock.

With last week's issue of the New Republic there was published a special eight-page technical "handbook" on the scientific, military and economic aspects of atomic energy, including the hydrogen bomb, useful for reference in connection with all three of the articles in this series.

– THE EDITORS

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Leo Szilard, Harold Urey and Irving Langmuir; the Chicago draft convention of 1946; Cuthbert Daniel and Arthur Squires, David F. Cavers, W. T. R. Fox, the Rev. R. E. Conway and the American Quakers in the United States; the Manchester *Guardian*, Lord Cherwell, R. F. Harrod and others in Britain.[6] Carlos P. Romulo of the Philippines, as president of the UN Assembly in 1949, urged it again in a letter to the Big Six.

Yet if this really represented the view of the majority, it made their proposal for international ownership and management of the atomic-power industry not merely superfluous but an unnecessary source of irreconcilable conflict with the Soviets. For if only a few small reactors to produce isotopes for research and medicine were authorized during the initial control period, it would be feasible to leave them to national ownership and management subject to other provisions and regulations of the control treaty. It would be time to institute international ownership, together with more elaborate safeguards against illegal diversion of fissionables, if and when the treaty was amended to permit large-scale operations for atomic power.

The Russians, it is noteworthy, did not challenge the sections of the *Second Report* that suggested postponing decisions on the quota problem until demanded by practical circumstances. Professor Dimitri V. Skobeltsin, the Russian physicist and technical adviser to Gromyko, had earlier expressed the issue succinctly:

> If the opinions of experts on the subject were to be accepted, it might be decades before atomic energy could be utilized in industry; and this would result in the simplification of the whole problem of the structure of the system of control. He [Skobeltsin] felt that some of the members were incorrectly basing their discussion on the belief that the application of atomic energy would be realized in the near future.[7]

As for the advisability of fixing production quotas, at whatever level, in the treaty itself, Gromyko had supported the idea on several occasions during the summer of 1947. We quote from his remarks, August 11, 1947:

> I said that the idea of quotas deserves attention and serious consideration by the Atomic Energy Commission; and if we agree in principle to accept such an idea, this agreement may advance us in the direction of general agreement on the question of establishing strict international control of atomic energy. It would not mean some other important question or questions will be automatically solved, but it would probably facilitate, or may facilitate, the solution of some other questions as well.[8]

Vishinsky took up the point in the UN Assembly debate a year later and argued that if production quotas were established in the treaty, a large part of the justification offered for international ownership would lose its force.[9]

It was a grave misfortune that the majority never seemed to realize the importance of the ownership issue or the extent to which their proposal, by attacking an unreal situation, enlarged the real difficulties.

Transition stages. On this subject the *Second Report* made no further contribution. The principle had been stated in the *First Report* that certification of the successful completion of one stage and progress to the next were to be by vote of the UNAEC.[10] The subject had not been discussed and, in fact, was deliberately avoided in 1947, being in the second or "political" category of the agenda; but the suggestion was made in the *Second Report* that taking charge of atomic source materials would be the first stage to be administered by the international agency.[11] The Russians adhered to their stand that whatever controls were adopted, the staging proposal was unacceptable. They also reiterated their advocacy of two treaties, the first outlawing atomic weapons, the second, a control convention, to follow. They were not to modify this position until a year later.

Sanctions. There were no policy changes in 1947 with respect to sanctions. The vague language of the *First Report* was permitted to stand as the majority position on the veto. The Russians continued to maintain that sanctions could be adopted only under the unanimity rule of the Security Council.

Administration. This subject was also not discussed in detail, though it had been included in the "technical" category of the Commission's agenda. The majority advocated the setting-up of an international agency, controlled by majority vote, to conduct all "dangerous" atomic enterprises and nuclear research. The Russians agreed to the international agency but hedged on the rule by majority vote. Precisely what modifications they desired is not clear.

This, then, was the Majority Plan, explicit only with respect to (1) international inspection for clandestine activities, and (2) many, but by no means all, of the aspects of international ownership and management of atomic-power industry. The latter was left in doubt because of the dicta regarding an "initial" period of control during which large-scale production might be prohibited. There were no concrete, working provisions with respect to production quotas and the timing of transition stages, the political heart of the entire scheme; sanctions were left in midair; the organization of the international agency was not considered. For all its formidable array of minutiae, the *Second Report* was not much closer to a full-grown control plan than the Acheson-Lilienthal Report.[12]

There is one further point of considerable political significance. The fact that the *Second Report* had solid

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majority backing apparently cast Russia in the ignoble role of "wrecker"; that is to say, as the one nation that obstructed the possibility of an atomic agreement and would therefore be responsible for any further deterioration of international relations. Thus, at any rate, the situation was reported to the world. Yet, as we have seen, this portrayal was oversimplified, to say the least. There were serious faults on both sides; defects in planning, logic and even good will. Both sides were guilty of bias as well as short-sightedness. The Soviets led their puppet allies; US leadership was also not always worthy of the name, not to say the dignity, of a free, democratic power dealing among equals. We may conclude this analysis by repeating the observations of Walter Lippmann on the overwhelming formal endorsement accorded the Majority Plan:

> The big votes for our plan, unanimous except for the Soviet bloc, have never had so much significance as it has been fashionable and official to say they had. Our strongest allies and partners have never been so happily confident and convinced of the soundness of our proposals and the wisdom of our tactics as their recorded votes have appeared to indicate.
>
> They assented to our leadership, and they suppressed their doubts and misgivings. They, too, thought we would have the monopoly of the bomb for several years more, and therefore the issue was not urgent. Moreover, they thought it expedient to present a solid front to the Russians, and also to Congress while it was considering the Marshall Plan and the military aid program.[13]

The Commission and the UN Assembly—1948 and 1949. The subsequent two and one-half years of the history of the atom in the United Nations can be very briefly summarized.

In 1948 the UNAEC majority questioned Gromyko at length on the Russian proposals of June, 1947, and issued an excellent brief proving that they were inadequate.[14] So they were, of course, and so they are still. It did not follow from this, however, that the Majority Plan was the only workable and safe solution; and at least part of Gromyko's defense of the Soviet proposals was that they did not purport to represent a complete and final plan and, indeed, that the Majority Plan itself was far from complete.[15]

Both sides seemed to have lost interest in continuing negotiations.[16] Russian apathy may not have been unrelated to Molotov's statement, in November, 1947, reporting that the USSR had won the "secret of atomic energy." This was generally dismissed as a bluff, but it is now clear that the Soviets by then had made substantial progress in the field. Nevertheless, the Russians were still apparently willing to negotiate and perhaps even to compromise. The hint came from Gromyko in response to questions put by the British and Chinese delegates. Would the Russians, it was asked, consider two simultaneous conventions—one on prohibition and one on control—instead of insisting on the first as condition precedent to the second? If this was seriously intended, Gromyko replied, a formal proposal should be made and his government would then give its official reaction. The British and Chinese delegates hastily dropped the matter.[17]

The *Third Report* of the Atomic Energy Commission (May 17, 1948) was a scissors-and-paste document of various resolutions and speeches in the UNAEC. It contained little fresh material, nor did it further elaborate the majority and minority plans. It served primarily as the procedural vehicle for transmitting to the General Assembly, via the Security Council, a recommendation by the majority that the work of the UNAEC be suspended. The reason given was that no further useful work could be done in the Commission because the minimum technical requirements for international control—international ownership and management and inspection—had not been accepted by the minority; and that the unfinished political questions on the agenda could not profitably be discussed until agreement was had on the technical issues.[18] In the Security Council, the USSR used its first veto in atomic-energy matters on a vote to approve the *First, Second* and *Third Reports*; but merely abstained when a move was made to transmit these reports to the Assembly for consideration.[19]

The 1948 Assembly in Paris. In the UN Assembly session in Paris in the autumn of 1948, the Assembly had the question of atomic-energy control before it for the first time since the Commission had been established early in 1946. Had it not been for the Berlin blockade, it might have been the primary business of the session.

The Canadians introduced a resolution asking the Assembly to endorse the Majority Plan; to condemn the Soviet proposals as inadequate and blame the USSR for the breakdown of negotiations; and to discontinue the work of the UNAEC until the Assembly should vote to revive it or the Big Five and Canada could agree that a basis for agreement existed in the Majority Plan.[20]

The UNAEC was being laid to rest.

But the Assembly was less compliant than had been expected. Led by Australia, India and some of the other "middle powers," it refused to acquiesce in the proposal. Only after substantial amendment was the Canadian resolution finally endorsed on November 4, 1948, by a vote of 40 for, six against, and four abstentions.[21]

The amended resolution was in effect a repudiation of much of the original majority proposal to the Assembly. It did, to be sure, endorse the Majority Plan, but it also directed the UNAEC to *continue* its work; and requested the Big Five plus Canada to engage in "consultations"; and ordered them to report back to the

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Assembly the following year.[22] The Majority Plan itself had the closest call of its sedentary career. In a somewhat involved series of votes, it narrowly escaped an endorsement "in substance"—the diplomatic euphemism for a meaningless, face-saving expression of confidence.[23]

But the biggest stir in the Assembly was caused by Vishinsky's move to abandon the extreme Russian bargaining position on transition stages, a stand which had been inflexibly maintained since the start of the UNAEC in June, 1946. Vishinsky now proposed that the UNAEC draft one convention to prohibit the use of the bomb and another for the control of atomic energy; and that both conventions take effect simultaneously.[24] (Gromyko, it will be recalled, had evinced interest in such a plan the previous winter.) The Assembly was not unimpressed by what it regarded as a major Russian concession, as indicated, for example, in the speeches of the Philippine, Ecuadorian, Indian and Syrian delegates. The US delegation could think of nothing better than to denounce Vishinsky's proposal as an "oriental maneuver." But on the final vote the Vishinsky resolution could muster no more than six votes, with 40 opposed.

Yet to judge the sentiments of the Assembly in respect of the Majority Plan by the vote alone would be a mistake. This is not to say that the Russians were gaining support for their proposal; for, apart from other considerations, the Russians had no full-fledged plan. But one is forced to conclude that there was a growing uneasiness, a feeling on the part of many of the delegates that the Majority Plan was inadequate, and failed to face, much less solve, several of the grave problems of international control. One of the staunchest supporters of the plan, François de Rose, the principal French negotiator in the UNAEC, expressed these misgivings in an article reviewing the Assembly debate:

> This leaves one possible course: to tackle the dreaded political problems of the stages of the transition from national to international control and of the principles governing the geographical locations of dangerous activities and facilities. . . . No one could exaggerate the difficulties of these two problems nor even the risks attached to examining them in public. To discuss "stages" means discussing the timing of the procedure through which the United States is divested of her secrets and the Soviet Union is penetrated by international personnel. Is this worth risking, for the sake of enlightening the General Assembly's debate, in the absence of agreement over the methods of control? . . .
>
> All these are matters to be pondered over by governments. Clearly, it was the political questions which were in everyone's mind at Paris, and these will reappear in 1949 in the same form unless the Commission is able to reflect the results of fruitful thinking in the interval.[25]

The "risk" to which de Rose referred was of course political; namely, that if the majority were to propose a system of plant and production quotas placing the USSR at a disadvantage relative to the rest of the world, and a staging timetable which, in the initial period at least, required the Russians to furnish information of military value while bomb stockpiles were maintained in the West, the majority position would undoubtedly be weakened in the eyes of the world and in future Assembly debates: weakened not in the sense that increased support would be given the Soviet proposals, but in the sense that the atomic deadlock would now be more clearly revealed as an objective dilemma of the contemporary world, rather than the result, solely, of Soviet intransigence.

The UNAEC and the Assembly in 1949-50. The governments of the West were not prepared to take this risk and the record of the UNAEC for 1949 was one of dismal inaction. A few unproductive meetings were held in the Commission, which the Assembly had kept alive; the "consultations" of the Big Five and Canada, which had been ordered, were postponed until just before the 1949 General Assembly session was to begin. The announcement of the Soviet atomic explosion may have moved ordinary men and perhaps even some of the UN representatives of the lesser powers; if it affected the Big Six there was little outward evidence of the fact. The chief US delegate went so far as to invite "alternative suggestions," but offered nothing of his own beyond the assertion that the Majority Plan was the best one put forward thus far.[26] The Soviets declined the invitation by simply ignoring it. Matters went no better in the Assembly. The great powers of the West, with their obedient following, addressed themselves to an essentially meaningless resolution for the continuation of the Big Six consultations—which was duly adopted; the Russians were, if anything, even stiffer than before.

Vishinsky delivered what was, even for him, an astonishingly mendacious and obtuse declamation in the course of which he apparently rejected the proposal that national production quotas for atomic energy be established in the control treaty. This evoked from M. Montel, a French delegate, the embarrassing reminder that a year earlier, before the UN Assembly, the ex-prosecutor had expressed the following dictum:

> One of the most important things is to regulate the production of atomic energy and to distribute atomic minerals among countries. This is a quota system. Thanks to this system of distribution, each country will have assigned to it, according to the advice of experts, a certain quota—in its own interest and in the interest of all the other countries.*

* In truth, however, the main emphasis of Vishinsky's speech lay in his specific objections to leaving any discretion to the international agency in assigning quotas and to the principle of proportional depletion of fissionable mineral reserves; thus it would not, in our opinion, be safe to conclude, regardless of Vishinsky's remarks, that Russia would reject the quota principle under any future circumstances of negotiation (see A/PV/253, pp. 41, 72-75).

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The Soviet delegation then staged its own charade in the form of a resolution blaming the US and Britain for failure to achieve agreement on atomic controls; voted on paragraph by paragraph, this was rejected by overwhelming majorities.[27]

This year (1950) the Soviet boycott of all UN discussions because of the dispute over Chinese representation has made impossible further consultations of the six permanent members of the UNAEC as requested by the General Assembly Resolution of 1949. Thus even the meeting ground in the United Nations for discussion and negotiation is at present unavailable.

This is the history, the long, inconclusive, often bewildering register of the major events. It is difficult for us to judge the entire record in perspective. But certain limited judgments are more easily come by—indeed, almost force themselves upon the attentive and disinterested chronicler. It may be useful to set them down.

1. Little was achieved; yet it seems likely that only little could be achieved on the one issue of atomic controls when agreement on no other major issue was forthcoming.

2. Many of the points in dispute reflected the objective dilemma of peaceful coexistence rather than the malevolence and the machinations of either side.

3. The Baruch Plan, and, almost to the same extent, the Majority Plan, are incomplete, technically imperfect and politically impractical. Neither was acceptable to the USSR; neither would, in all probability, have been acceptable to any great power except as a term of surrender following a military defeat. Had positions been reversed, we are inclined to think the US would also, quite properly, have regarded either plan as a threat to its political integrity and military safety.

4. The Russians offered no plan worth serious consideration. Their over-all policy was to stall and to denounce what others proposed. Now and again there seemed to be a flicker of hope that the Soviet delegates were sincerely seeking a path of accord; that their often valid criticisms of majority proposals were constructively motivated. If such favorable opportunities existed, the majority did nothing to explore, much less exploit, them. Evidently the suspicions of both blocs, confirmed by accompanying developments on the international scene, were too deep to permit of such a course.

5. Agreement failed because, in a sense, both sides willed it to fail: Russia, because the majority proposals were unacceptable; because she could not bargain as an equal until she had succeeded in making her own bombs (by which time other political circumstances had intervened and the position of the Communist and non-Communist blocs had hardened); because she was never as apprehensive of atomic weapons as the West thought she was; because her military power and geographical position were advantageous without regard to atomic weapons; because she was deeply distrustful of Western political, and perhaps military, designs; because she knew she would be outvoted on any international atomic commission; because of other international disputes; because of the tendency of the Western powers under US leadership to gang up on her on every issue regardless of its merits; and, finally, because she evidently failed to realize that (a) while no major power wanted war, war might come nonetheless, and (b) if it came, it would threaten the survival of mankind.

The US, and its Western associates, resisted agreement for reasons, some of which were twin—with emblems reversed—to those given above. It feared and hated Communism and Russian nationalism; it distrusted Russian intentions; it was convinced the USSR would not hold to any agreements entered into; it was uneasy about atomic disarmament while the Red Army remained intact; it clung to the protection of secrets and to the prospect of an extended American monopoly (even while quoting scientists to the effect that both safeguards were illusory). As for the British and French, they were never free to take an independent position or even to act as honest brokers: they had no bombs of their own and they were dependent on the US for economic aid.

Not all these fears were consciously sensed, but the fact that they lay underneath the surface made them no less effective in shaping policy. Indeed, it would have been better had they come into the open, for concealed, and often repressed, they become the mainsprings of irrational actions—of which there were not a few.

Finally, in assessing the failure to agree one must not rule out the role of accident and personality. Whatever the conditioning influences, history is still made by men. After 1946, the United States was either insufficiently concerned about the problem, or too despairing of a solution, to assign its best talent to the negotiations. This was true also of the other principal countries represented in the UNAEC majority. The Russians did somewhat better in this respect. Gromyko was their representative until his promotion to the post of Senior Deputy Foreign Minister in Moscow in 1948; and he is unquestionably one of their ablest and most experienced diplomats. The accident of not being elected to the Security Council, which carried with it membership on the Atomic Energy Commission, kept the two powers most disposed to mediate—India and Australia (after 1946)—out of the Commission; and the UN General Assembly, with its brief and hectic sessions, was an unsuitable forum for delicate and complex negotiations. The opportunity for making headway on the real issues presented itself briefly in 1947; one man of outstanding ability, courage and stature might have converted that opportunity into reality.

6. There is nothing about the atomic-control problem

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as such that makes a solution impossible. The events of the past prove this conclusion. The student examining the record cannot discover where some of the differences lay and wonders how men could haggle over phantom issues when agreements on principles often had been attained. But the truth is that the accord was illusory in all but one respect: this was the basic unwillingness to join in a common pact. The subject of the pact was secondary.

We shall turn then, in the next, and final, article, to the question: Can a control system be devised which meets enough of the objections, economic, political and military, and satisfies enough of the demands of Russia and the US to be acceptable to both—*provided* the facts of the hydrogen age are sufficiently understood to convince both that war is unthinkable and that a settlement must be found? Now that world opinion has once more been roused, there is another chance to try for an agreement; it may be the best chance as it may be the last, for the next year is likely to be decisive. The task is to discuss alternative methods for accord and for furthering peace; however, the nations themselves must realize as an act of will that there is no alternative to peace. Failing this realization, agreement of any kind is improbable.

Footnotes

[1]In some cases the following material is taken from the *First Report*, where the position was not modified in the *Second Report*.

[2]AEC, Official Records, Second Year, No. 3 (September 10, 1947).

[3]The majority proposals for inspection are contained in Part II of the *Second Report*, Chapter 6, and parts of Chapter 3. The majority proposals on international ownership and management are scattered through Chapters 1, 3, 4 and 5 of Part II.

[4]Acheson-Lilienthal Report, p. 42.

[5]*Second Report* of the UNAEC, Part II, Chapter 5, specific proposals XI (c) and XII (p. 54), and the following on p. 49:
"The production and stockpiling of denatured materials should be permitted if such denaturing is found to be effective. However, nuclear fuel in a form suitable for ready conversion to use in atomic weapons should not be produced in a quantity beyond that required for actual beneficial purposes. This restriction should be a provision of the treaty or convention, and should remain in effect until new technical findings and considerations of security warrant its revision. . . . Modification of this policy, therefore, should require amendment of the treaty or convention in accordance with terms of the latter."

[6]Leo Szilard, "Atomic Bombs and the Postwar Position of the US in the World" (A memorandum prepared in March, 1945, to be presented to President Roosevelt, and discussed with James F. Byrnes in May, 1945), *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, December, 1947, p. 352; testimony by H. C. Urey and Irving Langmuir before a Senate committee on November 29 and 30, 1945; Chicago Draft Convention, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June, 1946; Daniel and Squires, "The International Control of Safe Atomic Energy," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, April–May, 1947; D. F. Cavers, "Atomic Power versus World Security," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, October, 1947; R. E. Conway, "A-Bombs Away," *America*, January 22, 1949; Lord Cherwell, debate in the House of Lords, April 30, 1947, Hansard, pp. 147,244 *ff.*; R. F. Harrod in *The Atomic Age*, London, 1949; W. T. R. Fox, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, August, 1948.

[7]Quotation from a summary report, not a verbatim transcript, but ordinarily a full summary. AEC/C.2/55, p. 8 (July 1, 1947).

[8]Verbatim transcript, Appendix 4, AEC/C.2/80.

[9]A/SR/156, p. 15 (November 4, 1948).

[10]*First Report* of the UNAEC, Recommendation No. 5, p. 19.

[11]*Second Report* of the UNAEC, p. 31.

[12]There is an "official" version of the Majority Plan, prepared by the UNAEC Secretariat in 1949 and approved by majority vote of the Commission, which consists of selections from various reports of the Commission; but to anyone not familiar with the work of the UNAEC in some detail, it is very difficult to grasp. AEC/C.1/77 Rev. 2. (The US State Department has reprinted an earlier and not quite official version of this—AEC/C.1/77/Rev. 1—as State Department Publication No. 3646.)

[13]Walter Lippmann, syndicated column of February 7, 1950.

[14]*Third Report* of the UNAEC, Annex 4.

[15]*Third Report* of the UNAEC, Annex 5.

[16]It is of some interest to note that at no time between August 6, 1945, and the present day have there been, so far as can be discovered, any direct diplomatic negotiations or exploratory discussions between East and West on the control of atomic energy. The nearest approach was at the Moscow Conference in December, 1945, but we have Secretary Byrnes's testimony that the discussion was cursory and limited to the framing of a joint recommendation of the Big Three Foreign Ministers that a Commission be established in the UN to work on the control problem (Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 268). Henry L. Stimson had been a strong advocate of US talks with the Russians on this matter while he was in the Cabinet; but after his resignation in late September, 1945, his lead was never followed, although there were some in official position who shared his views (H. L. Stimson, *On Active Service*, New York, 1948, Chapter XXIV, "The Bomb and Peace with Russia"). This reliance on a single diplomatic avenue—the UN Commission—stands out in sharp contrast to the disarmament discussions in the League of Nations and the successful negotiations of the naval limitation treaties; in both these instances direct consultation between the principal parties was of major importance.

[17]AEC/C.1/PV/37, p. 21.

[18]*Third Report* of the UNAEC, Part I.

[19]S/PV/325 (June 22, 1948).

[20]Original draft of the Canadian Resolution, Document A/C.1/308 (September 30, 1948).

[21]A/SR/157, p. 40.

[22]Resolution 191 (III) of the General Assembly, November 4, 1948.

[23]A/SR/157 (November 4, 1948).

[24]A/C.1/SR/147, p. 7; A/C.1/310.

[25]François de Rose, "The Atomic Energy Debate at Paris—A French Appraisal," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January, 1949, p. 11.

[26]A/1045 (October 24, 1949).

[27]A/PV/254.

THE WEEK

VIBRATIONS OF HATRED

Senator McCarthy was hampered by the orderly processes of the Tydings subcommittee, so on the Senate floor, where he was safe from all libel laws, he pursued the task which he called "rodent destroying."

McCarthy mixed wild charges with vague excerpts from affidavits, tidbits from secret documents, and such proofs of Communist activity as opposition to Chiang Kai-shek. He tore out of context remarks made by Secretary Acheson and completely reversed their meaning. He quoted from an "affidavit" from a one-time Soviet general. The general, Alexander Barmine, stated that no affidavit had been made.

A small body of Senators protested in the name of reason. Senator Tobey (R, N. H.) asked that the entire documents be read. McCarthy explained with a grin that they contained such offensive details that he could only select excerpts. Senator Chavez (D, N. M.), conceeding for the sake of argument that all McCarthy's charges were true, asked what laws had been violated. McCarthy did not bother to reply. Senator Lehman (D, N. Y.) protested the clear violation of the civil-rights of those accused. McCarthy replied by condemning persons who "shed crocodile tears for the suffering to which the families of traitorous individuals are bound to be subjected." In his view, all were guilty until proved innocent.

It was rationality dealing with irrationality, reason dealing with unreason. To argue with McCarthy that the State Department is not a den of homosex-

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uals and spies proved as effective as to say to a man who claims he is Napoleon: "No, you are not Napoleon."

Rational argument presupposes a common desire to get at the truth. No such desire exists in this case. McCarthy is moving in the realm not of politics but of pathology. The problem is less the validity of his wild charges than the reasons why they occupy such a large part of the consciousness of the American people in 1950.

McCarthy represents the isolationists, pushing their batteries forward behind arguments that deal with today's tremendous problems at the level of the dime-store thrillers and the comic books. The isolationists' reëmergence is part of the growth of national paranoia in America under the pressure of the cold war. All peoples dominated by fear and frustration seek scapegoats. McCarthy's campaign for political blood-letting is of the same stuff as anti-Semitism: impossible to explain by rational argument and hard to deal with in rational ways. What McCarthy says is unimportant. He needs only to set up vibrations of hatred and mob violence and all those in resonance with these deep feelings vibrate with him.

In the years when news traveled by stagecoach and Washington was weeks from Chicago, time and distance insulated America from the germ carriers of hatred. Today a drop of poison injected into our bloodstream courses throughout our national body in a few moments. How is the poison counteracted? Great problems require thoughtful and searching debate in this campaign year. But if McCarthy and the isolationists have their way, the election will be dominated instead by subterranean feelings of anxiety, bitterness and unreasoning fear.

THE HOUSEWIFE'S FRIEND

"The American housewife knows that the unregulated independent gas producer for the past 25 years has protected her home and her children from the cold. . . . She knows that the unregulated independent gas producer has demonstrated by his record of service that he is her friend." So spoke Senator Robert S. Kerr, defending his pride and joy, the natural-gas bill.

The Kerr bill, which with minor differences passed the House last year, has been pushed through the Senate, 44 to 38, by a coalition of Dixiecrats and the most reactionary Republicans. In fact, more Democrats than Republicans voted for it as a result of lukewarm Administration opposition. With only four exceptions—Senators Dennis Chavez (N. M.), Herbert R. O'Conor (Md.), Estes Kefauver (Tenn.) and Frank P. Graham (N. C.)—the Southern and Southwestern Democrats voted solidly for the measure. The President's close friend, Secretary of the Senate Leslie Biffle, was actually working for the bill, spreading the word among Senators that President Truman would sign it if it passed.

Senator Paul Douglas (D, Ill.) led the fight against the powerful oil and gas lobby. Douglas made a 20,000-word speech which, with debate, extended over three days. It was documented with facts, figures and tables to demonstrate: the extent of recent gas-price increases; the probable huge future increases; the great concentration of gas sales and holdings; the already enormous profits of the big oil and gas companies which would benefit from the bill.

Douglas was backed up by liberal Democrats and Republicans but lacked the six votes necessary to defeat the bill. If it becomes law, the Federal Power Commission will be prevented from regulating the price of natural gas sold to the interstate pipelines. It will enable the big oil and gas companies to charge what the traffic will bear for natural gas. It will force consumers to pay extra annual amounts estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars and running into billions over a period of years.

The Democrats are now in an embarrassing position. The Republican 80th Congress at least refused to pass the Moore-Rizley bill, which would have accomplished substantially the same results as Kerr's measure. If the 81st Congress passes such a law, voters are apt to question Democratic attacks on the "special interests." It would be difficult to find a better example of special-interest legislation than this bill.

Late Friday afternoon, when many Representatives had left Washington, the House rammed the bill through with about 185 members absent. A bare majority was mustered only after Speaker Rayburn personally took the floor in favor of the Senate version, which then passed, 176 to 174. Against the bill were 115 Democrats, 58 Republicans and one ALP. Supporting it were 97 Democrats and 79 Republicans.

President Truman may still veto the bill. As yet, he remains officially uncommitted, but it is difficult to imagine his signing a measure that is so purely a present to the wealthy oil and gas interests.

NEGRO SOLDIERS

The Army has at last abolished the quota system which restricted the number of Negro enlistments to only 10 percent of the total force. In a short, routine directive, Major General Edward F. Witsell informed Army installations throughout this country and abroad that "effective with the month of April, all enlistments . . . within overall recruiting quotas will be open to qualified applicants without regard to race or color."

The original 10-percent quota was based on the fact that approximately one out of every 10 persons in the United States is a Negro. During the war periods, the number of Negroes in the armed services was limited to 10 percent. But between wars, the ratio of Negro troop strength has been much smaller, about one out of every 40, as in the early 1930's.

When the Federal Army was reorganized following the Civil War, the Act stipulated that "the enlisted men of two regiments of infantry and . . . two regiments of cavalry shall be colored men." And so, until World War II, the Regular Army provided for the peacetime enlistment of Negroes in the 24th and 25th Infantry Regiments and the 9th and 19th Cavalry Regiments. The four outfits always had a high reenlistment record and, therefore, did not offer even the normal number of openings for recruits. After the close of the last war, Negroes so greatly exceeded the 10 percent estimated and allotted that the Army temporarily restricted further enlistments to certain specialists and to those who could make a score of 99 on the AGC test (an approximate indication that the man has the equivalent of a high-school education).

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The new policy probably will not result in an immediate jump in the number of Negro enlistments. During peacetime, standards are higher and usually a minimum number of qualified Negro and white applicants are accepted. When the Air Force abolished the quota system last year, the number of Negro enlistments rose from 6.4 percent to only 6.7 percent. Abolition of the quota system, however, is a very important step toward the eventual goal of complete integration of Negro and white troops in the armed forces which President Truman and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson have promised.

"THE SHADOW OF THREATS"

The Supreme Court has ruled that federal employees, even in these times of loyalty investigations, can be impartial jurors in cases involving Communist defendants. The Court upheld the conviction of Eugene Dennis, secretary of the Communist Party, found guilty of contempt of Congress in 1947 for disobeying a subpoena to appear before the House Un-American Activities Committee. There were seven government workers on the 12-man District Court jury which convicted Dennis. Dennis argued that government employees would be afraid to risk the charge of disloyalty or loss of their jobs which might result from a vote for his acquittal.

There have been three previous cases before the Supreme Court involving the presence of government employees on District of Columbia juries. One prompted an Act of Congress in 1935, redefining eligibility of government workers for jury service. The constitutionality of that Act was sustained in *United States v. Wood*. Last week the majority of the Court—Chief Justice Fred Vinson, and Justices Minton, Burton, Reed and Jackson (who wrote a concurring opinion)—held that the Act makes no exception for distinctive circumstances, that it should be uniformly applied, and that government workers, therefore, "are not challengeable solely by reason of their employment."

Justices Black and Frankfurter, in separate dissents, severely questioned the "impartiality" of a jury of government workers. The difficulty of securing an impartial jury, Justice Black pointed out, is revealed by the number of potential jurors who felt that Dennis' position as Secretary of the Communist Party alone would prevent their giving him a fair trial. "And the prevailing pattern of loyalty investigations and threatened purges," he said, "makes it wholly unrealistic to expect government employees to enter the jury box with that quality of disinterestedness essential to complete impartiality."

Justices Clark and Douglas took no part in the case. Justice Jackson, while concurring with the majority, reiterated his past opposition to government workers serving on District of Columbia juries. He said he could not agree with the dissenters, however, for "as long as accused persons who are Republicans, Dixiecrats, Socialists or Democrats must put up with such a jury, it will have to do for Communists."

In the majority opinion, Justice Minton said that the "vague conjecture . . . that government employees are so intimidated that they cringe before their government in fear of investigation and loss of employment if they do their duty as jurors . . ." is not convincing. The majority insisted that "while one of an unpopular minority group must be accorded that solicitude which properly accompanies an accused person, he is not entitled to unusual protection or exception."

Justice Black, in his dissent, said that to believe federal workers could meet objective tests of complete impartiality in the trial of cases like this is to disregard human nature:

> Probably at no period of the nation's history has the "loyalty" of government employees been subjected to such constant scrutiny and investigation by so many government agents and secret informers. And for the past few years press and radio have been crowded with charges by responsible officials and others that the writings, friendships, or associations of some government employee have branded him "disloyal." Government employees have good reason to fear that an honest vote to acquit a Communist or anyone else accused of "subversive" beliefs, however flimsy the prosecution's evidence, might be considered a "disloyal" act which could easily cost them their job. That vote alone would in all probability evoke clamorous demands that he be publicly investigated or discharged outright; at the very least it would result in whisperings, suspicions, and a blemished reputation.

Both Black and Frankfurter emphasized the point that the Court, in previous cases, clearly indicated that "particular issues or circumstances" might require exclusion of government employees in order to assure an impartial jury. The *Wood* opinion cautioned that a government worker could be disqualified if "in view of the nature or circumstances of his employment, or of the relation of the particular governmental activities to the matters involved in the prosecution, or otherwise, he had actual bias. . . ."

Frankfurter declared:

> There is a pervasiveness of atmosphere in Washington whereby forces are released in relation to jurors who may be deemed supporters of an accused under a cloud of disloyalty that are emotionally and qualitatively different from those which come into play in relation to jurors dealing with offenses which in their implications do not touch the security of the nation. Considering the situation . . . it is asking more of human nature in ordinary government employees than history warrants to ask them to exercise that "uncommon portion of fortitude" which the Founders of this nation thought judges could exercise only if given a life tenure.

He quoted one of the well-known observations of Justice Holmes (*Rex v. Davies*) on such psychological influences: "This is not a matter for polite presumptions; we must look facts in the face. Any judge who has sat with juries knows that in spite of forms they are extremely likely to be impregnated by the environing atmosphere."

Black concluded his dissent by remarking:

> My belief is that no defendant charged with such an offense should be forced to accept a government employee as a juror. Nor should the Government want such an unfair advantage. . . . Impartiality [in the jury-box] cannot survive in the shadow of threats to a juror's reputation and livelihood.

MOB RULE IN CHICAGO

CHICAGO (NR correspondent)

When 58 men were arrested for violence in the Peoria Street race riot last November (see the *NR*, January 9), Chicago was divided into two camps, each awaiting the court decision that would express official policy. After five months, 25 defendants were freed. As Muncipal Court Judge Joseph H. Mc-

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Garry dismissed three of the men he said:

". . . This was an organized incident. . . . This miserable conspiracy was hatched and put into effect by a small but highly organized vocal group of subversive agents, professional agitators, and saboteurs."

The judge was not talking about the racists who made up the mob. His indignation was directed against the people the mob tried to terrorize. He did not precisely call anyone a saboteur, but explained that "to convict these [defendants] the court would have to accept the testimony of Bindman and Victor Ludwig [an associate] which it does not do . . . because of their attitude and demeanor on the stand."

The five-day riot began when Aaron Bindman, a member of the CIO Warehouse and Distribution Workers Union, Local 208, held a reception for a friend. Eight of those invited were Negroes, all shop stewards. That night more than 200 people gathered before his newly purchased home to protest. Their anger soon flared as rumors of the Negro visitors spread. During the succeeding days, the crowd, which the police at first ignored, swelled to 2,000 people whose hatred for Negroes was soon extended to Jews. After concerted pressure by civic groups, police ended the riot, but the vacuum was filled with a notable increase of activity by segregationists. A Commission on Human Relations was appointed to investigate the incident.

Those who had hoped for strong official words against such racial uprisings were disappointed. Two weeks after the riot Mayor Kennelly said, "Chicago has a reputation for the friendliness of its people in their relations with each other which has increased year by year. Nothing must be allowed to happen which would disrupt this relationship, particularly anything due to difference of race or religion." For its mildness, this message drew anger from many civic groups, and soon full-page advertisements appeared in the newspapers urging Kennelly to be more conclusive. The Mayor then said, "I wish to amplify my statement. All citizens of Chicago are entitled to the same rights regardless of race, color or creed. Police have definite orders to disperse any crowd gathering for the purpose of harassing citizens or to do anything which could disturb order in the community."

While the amplification placated some, others, like Sidney Williams of the Urban League, asked, "Why doesn't Mayor Kennelly say people can live where they wish and invite whoever they wish into their homes without danger?" Opponents of segregation agree that new race riots are inevitable if the city administration continues in its present course. There are a few encouraging signs. The police department is being lectured on race relations by the eminent sociologist, Professor Joseph Lohman of the University of Chicago. But so far the opposition has scored a running victory in its rabble-rousing-propaganda campaign.

SCHOOLS WITHOUT TEACHERS

The crisis in our public schools is more serious than ever. Last week Federal Security Administrator Oscar Ewing announced that next year there will be one million more children attending our elementary schools than were enrolled this year. And there will be an unprecedented annual increase of more than 1.5 million in 1952-53.

The official journal of the Office of Education (*School Life*) predicts that "by 1959-60 there will be 10,500,000 more children enrolled in elementary and high schools throughout the United States than in 1946-47." This increase alone represents a greater number of pupils than the total enrolled in California, Illinois, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Texas in 1946.

By 1960, the nation will need 350,000 additional teachers to meet the minimum of one teacher per 30 pupils. And that does not include replacements for teachers withdrawing from the school system because of age, marriage, illness, etc. Nor does it provide for the supervisory personnel or specialized teachers who will also be needed.

The tremendous increase will call for additional school facilities as well as more teachers. "At current prices," the Office of Education estimates, "a properly equipped classroom, together with requisite auxiliary facilities such as library, gymnasium, auditorium, cafeteria, nurse's quarters, and play space, will cost about $30,000, or roughly $1,000 per enrollee."

The House Education and Labor Committee, which rejected the $300 million general-aid bill, is now considering school-construction legislation, already passed by the Senate. Bills introduced by Senator Hubert Humphrey (D, Minn.) and Representative Hugh Mitchell (D, Wash.) authorize $5 million for grants to state educational agencies to assist in surveys of school building needs and development of state plans for new construction. An unspecified amount is provided for long-range building in addition to funds to take care of the acute shortages that now exist. Out of the appropriations for the first fiscal year of this program, the bill specifies that 70 percent of the first $100 million is to be earmarked for grants for such emergency needs. School construction may be the one substitute for general aid to education approved by this Congress.

THE WASHINGTON POST

"You mean I'm supposed to stand on that?"

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OUTSIDE AMERICA

Easter, always Rome's best season, is particularly joyful this year for the Vatican's Secretariat of State. Since the start of Holy Year, the governments of seven European nations—Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Italy, Austria, Ireland and Western Germany—have moved farther along the political road to Rome. The government of France has appeared sympathetic. And the government of Britain, which was holding up the procession, has lost much of its power to obstruct.

Spain, Portugal and Belgium are turning toward monarchism. Umberto is sending from Portugal messages of hope to his followers in Italy. Naturally this pleases the gentlemen who run the political headquarters of the Church of Rome. In their scale of values, Socialism is only a hair's breadth from Communism; and to combat the evils of 1917, the scarcely less evil liberalism of 1789 should be confronted with the enlightened conservatism of the Old Regime. What Europe needs in order to turn from anarchy to order is the legitimacy of Metternich and Talleyrand.

Germany's Adenauer, Austria's Figl, Ireland's McBride, Portugal's Salazar have sought guidance at the Vatican. Italy's de Gasperi has acted as host to Spain's Artajo; he has also dropped from his government those Christian Democrats of the Left who gave social justice a higher value than submission to religious orthodoxy.

The Western German state has become dominantly clerical. Franco is "reforming" Spain to remove the shadow of Fascism in favor of its substance. Salazar is turning the *Estado Novo* into a total rather than a partial corporativist entity. France's Bidault is flirting politically with de Gaulle, who is a Christian if not a democrat.

The greatest political reason for jubilation after three months of the Jubilee Year was the result of the British election. Until last autumn, Vatican political policy pointed toward a united Western Europe without Britain. That policy changed during the winter. The reason was the real possibility—reported to the Vatican from Washington—of a change in the British regime.

A week before the election, ECA chief Paul Hoffman told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Labour Government was "torpedoing our efforts toward achieving an integrated economy in Western Europe." Three days before the election, General William J. Donovan held a press conference in New York. He made public the views of statesmen in 14 countries on the subject of Western European union. He also gave his personal views. These, according to the Manchester *Guardian*, left the impression in the American press that Clement Attlee and Ernest Bevin "are the bad boys whose knavish chauvinism is frustrating the united efforts of the other 13 governments."

Naturally, the Donovan story was played up in the anti-Labour press in Britain. Perhaps its timing had nothing to do with the election. Perhaps it had little or no effect on the voters. Yet, the impression left in the Western European press was that Donovan was not giving his opinions merely in his role as chairman of the American Committee on United Europe. He was getting anti-Labour headlines in the British press in his role as one of the most important Catholic laymen in the United States, a man with exceptionally good connections among Vatican statesmen concerned with British affairs.

Also during the week before the British election, Donovan went to Columbia University to have a medal pinned on him. Hoffman, who had gone on record as calling British Labour the wrecker of integration, was there. So was General Dwight D. Eisenhower, whose recently expressed views made him no friend of the British Labour Government. The decoration given to Donovan was the Alexander Hamilton medal.

That, too may have been nothing more than a coincidence. But it remains true that the Vatican, in its strong pro-Americanism, far prefers the America of the tradition of Hamilton to that of Thomas Jefferson—or of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Hamilton would have understood the corporative state and hated the Welfare State. The Vatican isn't exceedingly pro-British, but as the lesser of evils it prefers the Britain of Churchill to that of Attlee. Churchill is a man who understands the Metternich-Talleyrand notion of legitimacy.

And to continental Europeans of the liberal Left, the emergence of Donovan into public print at the moment and in the way he chose was another suggestion that the Vatican no longer considers Britain an impediment to *its* kind of integrated, united Western Europe. Hoffman's economics and Donovan's politics don't conflict (to say the least) with the morality of the Secretariat's program.

So Easter is an especially good season for the Vatican's political leaders. They can see American Hamiltonians bringing pressure to bear to give the British government back to the forces of order—to Churchill; to Sir Patrick Hannon, the Catholic leader; to Duncan Sandys, Brendan Bracken, Sir Oliver Lyttelton and the other spokesmen for Lombard Street and the cartels.

The British political struggle didn't end in February. It is only now getting seriously into motion, and a number of men who aren't British are taking part in it, in one way or another. Frenchmen of the Left tend to oversimplify the issue. Marcel Gimont, in *Combat* of Paris, wrote: "A Labour England still has some chance to detach itself . . . from the domination of the dollar; a Conservative England is doomed to a quick and complete alignment."

But Englishmen of the Left see that the danger isn't simply capitalism or Americanism. It is that Americans, in quite good faith—a liberal faith—may lend themselves to maneuvers in England and in Western Europe which will give even more satisfaction at the Vatican. The *New Statesman* wrote:

> The danger is lest, believing that institutions which are good for them must be good for everyone else, and wishing to consolidate the Atlantic Pact by welding Western Europe into a unified anti-Communist power, they [the Americans] may seek to impose upon its peoples forms of unity which are compatible neither with economic recovery nor with the reality of democratic control.

PERCY WINNER

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POINT FOUR WHITTLED AWAY

by Helen Fuller

PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S Point Four program has now become a matter of urgent necessity. Ambassador-at-large Philip Jessup reports that unless economic aid of the kind contemplated under that plan is quickly made available, there will be nothing to stand in the way of Communism's advance through the crucial area of Southeast Asia. All over the world, the need for a concrete demonstration of America's peaceful and friendly intentions is desperately clear. Belatedly, the Department of State and the White House are awakening to the importance of the policy they announced more than a year ago and have shamefully neglected ever since.

In his Inaugural Address, President Truman declared that the US, under his leadership, would make "the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas." We recognize, the President said, that this is our responsibility because "Democracy alone can supply the vitalizing force to stir the peoples of the world into triumphant action, not only against their human oppressors, but also against their ancient enemies, hunger, misery, and despair."

The downtrodden of the earth took heart from this splendid promise. Small nations based their hopes and plans on it. The United Nations Assembly unanimously voted to set up a "Technical Assistance Board" to help direct the experts and the "know-how" to where they were most needed. The US Government, however, consigned the plans for its "bold new program" to the mills of government bureaucracy.

Point Four had been a complete improvisation in the first place. Clark Clifford and other Presidential advisers, in working on Truman's Inaugural Address, felt the lack of any hopeful new idea in what they had drafted. The State Department had offered nothing at all of this sort. At the last minute, Clifford remembered a proposal for large-scale international development offered by one of the departments months before and laid aside. Into the speech it went. No plan of organization existed for carrying out the basic idea. The morning after the President unveiled Point Four, half the agencies of the government began meeting in interdepartmental committees to work out the details.

It took six months of such sessions to reconcile the vested interests of the departments and get agreement on the form the new program should take and how it should operate.

At length, the problem was divided into two parts: (1) providing the technical assistance and (2) assuring the necessary capital investment needed to raise standards of living in the backward areas. The State Department was given responsibility for the first question. Truman's powerful National Advisory Council was put in charge of credit policies with regard to the underdeveloped countries.

In his initial Point Four proposal, the President had made it clear that this "should be a coöperative enterprise in which all nations work together through the United Nations and its specialized agencies wherever practicable." This was not to be "the old imperialism" but "a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing." The welfare of the countries to be developed, and not the profits of American business, was to be the prime concern.

Truman's original concept was first diluted by the National Advisory Council. Its members, the three leading reactionaries in the Administration—Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder, Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer, and Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board Thomas B. McCabe—have consistently knifed the President, on foreign as well as domestic matters. In this case, the NAC advised the White House that governmental guarantees of private investments in the underdeveloped countries were all that would be necessary to produce an adequate flow of credit. The government should guarantee American businessmen that the profits they made in overseas ventures would be convertible into dollars and that the government would make up any capital losses from expropriation or other damage at the hands of countries in which investments were made. That was the extent of the NAC program.

The facts were that neither American nor European private capital was ready to go into the underdeveloped areas in any great amounts, even with such guarantees. So long as profits at home continue high, American businessmen will be reluctant to take risks abroad.

The State Department, meanwhile, had gone ahead with a small-scale beginning plan of technical assistance which adhered to the general spirit of the President's original Point Four speech. It proposed a first-year appropriation of $45 million for US participation in "economic, engineering, medical and educational" projects, and certain surveys and demonstrations. These programs could be carried out through the UN or through US or private agencies, as the President saw fit.

Truman, in accepting the inadequate plan for investment proposed by the bankers in his Administration, seriously damaged his original concept before the rough hands of Congress ever touched it.

Representative Christian A. Herter (R, Mass.), who

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had tried to turn the Marshall Plan into a straight-profit deal for American business in Europe, now went to work on Point Four. The Big Business version of Point Four which Herter later introduced would have limited the assistance one government could provide another to agriculture, health, sanitation and education. To be eligible for even this kind of help, under the Herter brand of imperialism, countries would first have to enter into bilateral agreements to protect US investors under all circumstances. The Herter-Big Business formula did not contemplate *any* use of the United Nations.

Instead of flatly informing Herter that the bill before the House Foreign Affairs Committee dealt only with technical assistance and had nothing to do with principles of investment, Department officials chose to seek a compromise with him and the interests he was representing. In this and in other important respects, the State Department displayed a weakness of will and a lack of political finesse. By agreeing to compromise with Herter, it lent Administration sanction to a new bill which played down the need for multilateral programs and which, instead, emphasized agreements which must be exclusively bilateral between the US and the country receiving aid. Fortunately, due to the skill and diligence of three Foreign Affairs Committee members—Jacob K. Javits (R, N.Y.), Helen Gahagan Douglas (D, Calif.) and A. S. J. Carnahan (D, Mo.) —most of the damage was repaired in closed committee sessions.

In choosing men to work with Congress on this legislation, the State Department again was unwise. Instead of selecting representatives who reflected the conviction, the hope, and the basic belief contained in the President's original suggestion, the Department assigned an old-fashioned back-slapper as chief of liaison with Capitol Hill.

The Department also failed to mobilize public support. Point Four received no such buildup as that given the Marshall Plan. Instead of encouraging the large national organizations which were enthusiastic about the program to lobby for it, the State Department actually shut them out of its councils.

What public pressure was finally brought on members of the House to back Point Four was largely the work of 17 independent groups which formed a "Point Four information service." Through this emergency clearing house, inter-church groups, the major farm organizations, the coöperatives and all branches of labor worked together to impress Congress with the fact that popular support for Point Four did exist.

When the enemies of foreign aid pressed to include the Point Four program in an omnibus bill covering ECA and numerous smaller aid plans, the State Department again yielded. Most politicians realized, as the diplomats apparently did not, that no new spending program for overseas aid, however small, would receive favorable attention when taken up in conjunction with the added billions being asked in behalf of ECA for next year.

Will the President insist that his idea be given a fair chance in the Senate? Secretary Acheson and his chief adviser, Ambassador Jessup, in their opening testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, were more urgent than before about authorization to launch the Point Four program.

The same kind of opposition as existed in the House is forming in the Senate. Chairman Tom Connally of the Foreign Relations Committee is opposed to bringing the UN into the Point Four program in any way. Bilateral aid, he says, is the only kind that will exact the direct gratitude to which the US is entitled. If the President himself, and the State Department, are as delinquent in organizing public support for the program in the Senate as they were in the House, no better outcome can be anticipated. If, instead of timorously seeking the lowest common denominator in the Senate, the State Department will actually raise the goals for Point Four, its chances for an acceptable beginning in international development will be improved. Because great potential strength for a far-reaching Point Four program exists in the churches, the unions and the independent citizens' groups of the country, a vigorous stand on this legislation might also be of great help in rebuilding damaged State Department prestige in the country.

One group of Senators intends to propose a stronger and broader Point Four than that sponsored by the Administration. The State Department should encourage these men, as a positive indication that the Administration is actively seeking the best program for international development obtainable from this Congress. Some members of the Upper House have been impressed, as have many independent organizations, with the facts brought forward in a series of studies recently completed by the Public Affairs Institute (PAI) of Washington. This independent research organization, under Dr. Dewey Anderson, has published a series of seven detailed reports on what an adequate world-development program would include and how such a program could benefit the US economy.

To transform the Administration's one-lung technical-assistance program into a real alternative to Russian expansion, the experts of the PAI advocate: "a 50-year program of joint effort and investment by all the countries of the world, carried out largely under UN auspices." The general objective would be to increase incomes by two percent annually by industrializing

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one-fourth of the workers in the underdeveloped countries over a 50-year period and improving land use to raise their basic standard of living.

This would require an average investment of $7 billion per year, or $350 billion over the 50 years. United Nations agencies would be used heavily; aid would be open to all nations on both sides of the Iron Curtain, provided they agreed to specified supervision by the UN. Technical assistance would include "low-level" training in work centers as well as the export of experts. Until private investment began to flow to the backward areas, public credit in the first five years of the new program would be provided through:

¶ US purchase of additional stock in the International Bank to permit an extra $2.5 billion in loans from this source.

¶ A $2.5 billion increase in the loan authorization of the Export-Import Bank.

¶ An additional $2 billion of loan capital through a long-term, low-interest international-resource-conservation corporation, to be established in the US.

¶ A $2 billion revolving credit fund for coöperatives to be operated by the United Nations.

To talk of so broad an extension of the Point Four proposal when the House has just slashed a very much smaller program may look at first like rank political foolishness. To plan for investment and technical development on any lesser scale, however, would be greater folly.

The pitifully weakened technical-assistance program authorized by the House will be a serious embarrassment to the United States when the technical-aid conference of the United Nations meets at Lake Success on May 17.

With only $25 million, instead of the $45 million requested by the Administration, available for new commitments, and with $10 million of that already earmarked for existing development programs, the US will be in no position to argue vigorously in these important meetings. Our representatives have urged other countries to come to this conference prepared to contribute generously in order to match US funds for new development projects. Unless the Senate acts quickly to reinstate international development as a major part of our foreign policy, the "bold new program" will be shown up before all the United Nations as a cruel hoax, and the promise of the President of the United States as only empty words.

HAROLD L. ICKES: "A Decoration for McCarthy"

If it is a practice of Marshal Stalin to recognize outstanding services to the Soviet Union, then he is doubtless already aware that Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin has earned the biggest and shiniest medal of them all. Senator McCarthy's useful services to the Communists should be especially appreciated by them because he is serving as a volunteer. This makes his recent performance all the more notable. He is not even being paid by the Politburo for his blatherskite assistance. What he has been doing would be priceless in terms of mere money.

The word "treason" is too narrowly defined to apply to the acts of grave disservice to his country in which the Wisconsin Senator has recklessly indulged. One can greatly harm his country, especially in other lands, short of plotting against it or carrying arms against it. Without being able to produce any facts thus far to sustain his reckless charges, Senator McCarthy has been indulging in the rawest type of propaganda for the purpose of discrediting Secretary Acheson and those associated with him in conducting our foreign affairs. His is the raucous voice of a Goebbels. The master liar of Germany never served Hitler to better effect than McCarthy is now serving the Communists. He is a greater danger to our American institutions than the Communists in this country could be even if they were multiplied a hundred times.

It is to be expected that the aim of the Communists would be, deliberately and persistently, to undermine and discredit our democratic institutions. But that a Senator of the United States, however lacking he may be in intellectual integrity, should deliberately undertake to achieve the same result is a sad commentary upon the type of public servant in this country that blathering Joe typifies. Unfortunately, there are a few reckless ignoramuses who applaud him. The saddest and least understandable phase of *l'affaire McCarthy* is that he has had the silent encouragement of decent and respected Republican Senators. It is natural that Senators Bridges and Wherry should seek their level in the gutter alongside their ranting colleague. That is where they belong. On the other hand, all citizens, regardless of party, can take pride in the fact that Senators Flanders, Saltonstall and Ives, all of them Republicans, have hastened to dissociate themselves from the political gangster from Wisconsin.

As for Secretary Acheson, I continue to disagree with a number of things that he has said and done. But I resent Senator Wherry's scurrilous characterization of him as a "security risk." This lying traduction is what

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might be expected from a cowardly slanderer skulking behind his Congressional immunity. This dastardly slur upon a high-minded, if sometimes honestly mistaken, public servant shows what manner of men constitute the McCarthy front. The "falling" Bridges of New Hampshire would attack and smear everyone in the State Department. It all goes to show the despicable depths to which they, too, have sunk in order to play their obscene brand of politics.

It was McCarthy who, when he was a circuit-court judge in Wisconsin, committed acts that the Supreme Court of that state characterized as "highly improper" and "an abuse of judicial power." His ethical standards were so low as to be practically nonexistent. When he ran for the Senate in 1944 he failed to resign as judge, thus using his courtroom for political purposes. This misbehavior was so raw that the Wisconsin Bar Association petitioned the State Supreme Court to disbar him. He should have been disbarred, but courts are weakly loath at times to chastise fellow judicial officers. However, the court did hold that "no valid excuse or justification can be offered for the defendant's violation of the oath which he took . . . as a circuit-court judge." Lucky it was for this man who now seeks his own low political level, while discrediting his party, that the Supreme Court of his state felt that McCarthy's violation of the code of ethics of the legal profession did not "disclose such a degree of moral turpitude as to disbar him from the practice of law." Only a "little moral turpitude"—"only a little pregnant"!

Our American institutions rest upon a foundation of taxes levied and paid. In 1943 the state of Wisconsin claimed that McCarthy had not disclosed an income of $42,000. The defense offered was that although McCarthy held a judgeship in the state, he was not a resident thereof! In the end, the claim was compromised, but only after McCarthy had tried to wriggle out of paying anything. Did this attempted tax evasion make him a "poor security risk" or did it not? Let Wherry answer. In 1944, when McCarthy ran for the Senatorial nomination against Senator Wiley, he accepted a contribution of $18,000 from his father, his brother and his brother-in-law. Yet it was later discovered that McCarthy's father did not have enough income to require the filing of a tax return, and that neither his brother nor his brother-in-law filed a return of more than $2,000!

Secretary Acheson's friends proudly refer to him as "a gentleman and a scholar." There are times that call for a moratorium on gentlemanliness. There are times when scholarly attributes should give way to righteous indignation. There are times when an Acheson should give the direct lie to a political guttersnipe.

HAROLD L. ICKES

BOOKS IN REVIEW

THE POLITICS OF PREJUDICE

by David Spitz

UNLIKE THE REFORMER or the revolutionary who seizes upon discontent to urge a change in the political structure, the agitator seeks no rational cause and proposes no real solution. Instead, he perpetuates and aggravates the dissatisfaction by ignoring causes and attacking people. When you ask *what*, he answers as if you had asked *who*.

PROPHETS OF DECEIT, by Leo Lowenthal and Norbert Guterman (Harpers; $2.50).
REHEARSAL FOR DESTRUCTION, by Paul Massing (Harpers; $4).

How the American agitator says *who* is the subject of the book by Lowenthal and Guterman. Massing's work, a study of political anti-Semitism in imperial Germany, suggests some of the reasons *why*. Taken together, these books treat rationally the seeming irrationality of prejudice, and make clear the unifying patterns beneath. They dispel the illusion that prejudice is a quality only of the ignorant and uneducated by noting that in Germany, for example, anti-Semitism came primarily from professional urban groups. They deny the view that prejudice is a class phenomenon by pointing out that even some of the Socialist followers of Lassalle, a Jew, were anti-Semitic. They suggest that the great evil of agitation is not the dissemination of deceit but the disruption of social unity: the agitator who portrays the "enemy" as one with whom there can be no compromise divides society into two irreconcilable camps, thereby institutionalizing hatred and rendering democracy difficult if not impossible.

Agitation, it is argued, begins with frustration. The agitator plays upon the disillusionment of his followers, humiliating them for their failures but at the same time holding forth the hope of future success. He does this by telling them that they are the victims of a perennial conspiracy, that it is not they but the "enemy" who is responsible, and that he, their leader—who is one of them yet above them—can lead them to victory.

Who is the "enemy"? Politically, he is the radical and those who are denounced by the radical, the holder of power and the foreigners who seek it. Psychologically, he is the criminal, the degenerate, the low animal. He is the Jew, who unites Communism and capitalism in the same person. He is everyone not themselves. He is dangerous but he can be defeated; for "the wolf in sheep's clothing is actually a sheep in wolf's clothing." The "enemy" disguises his weakness by daring to be arrogant, but the leader can penetrate the

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disguise. Thus the agitator gives his followers not simply words but a quarry to be hunted; he provides them with an effective method of relief; they can vent their resentment, their frustration, on some helpless victim.

Why should the agitator employ these tactics? Why should people surrender to them? Massing suggests two basic reasons. One is that anti-Semitism is not a means but an end. Hermann Bahr wrote:

> An anti-Semite wants to be an anti-Semite. It is a sensation to be indulged in . . . the morphine of the small people. . . . It matters little whom they hate. The Jew is just convenient. . . . If there were no Jews the anti-Semite would have to invent them.

Prejudice is also employed as a means to an end. The use of the out-group as a scapegoat for the frustrated in-group is too common to require more than mention here. No less important, however, is the exploitation of prejudice to unite otherwise dissimilar groups against a common foe. In Germany it at one time united political Catholicism and Prussian conservatism against liberals and Social Democrats. Later it was used by liberals and even revolutionaries against conservatives, and by conservatives against liberals. This opportunistic character of anti-Semitism was revealed by the conservative agitator Adolf Stoecker when he complained of the anti-conservative Otto Boeckel: "He pursues the wrong kind of anti-Semitism."

For both these groups, reason is irrelevant. The exposure of false charges is of little avail when the real grounds on which people hold their beliefs are not the grounds alleged. But for men of good will who seek information rather than emotional response, these books will repay careful exploration.

Their limited scope, however, produces certain flaws. For example, the theme of the Lowenthal-Guterman book is agitation; it is also anti-Semitism and fascism. These are not the same, and to treat them as if they were is a fundamental confusion. Men like Coughlin, Pelley and Gerald L. K. Smith are anti-Semitic and fascist; but one can be anti-Semitic without being a fascist, and there are agitators who are neither. Moreover, the agitators examined here are the agitators who failed. There are forces, and perhaps agitators, counteracting these techniques; and it is important not to ignore them. Similarly, an interpretation of individual susceptibility to prejudice that minimizes or ignores economic and cultural factors to focus on psychological considerations is necessarily insufficient. It does not explain why diverse personalities and groups embrace anti-Semitism in varying degree; nor does it account for the expression of anti-Semitism at certain times rather than others.

Nevertheless, these books (sponsored by the American Jewish Committee) auspiciously begin a series of Studies in Prejudice that promises to add immeasurably to our understanding of that unhappy and calamitous theme.

David Spitz, assistant professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, is the author of Patterns of Anti-Democratic Thought, published last spring by Macmillan.

THE "BEST" HYPOTHESIS

NINETEENTH CENTURY STUDIES, by Basil Willey (Columbia University Press; $4).

ALTHOUGH IT HAS a different kind of title, this is the third of what have come to be known as Professor Willey's "background books"; the first two of which—*The Seventeenth Century Background* and *The Eighteenth Century Background*—dealt with aspects of the history of ideas in England in the two earlier centuries with an eye on the student of literature who wanted insight into the intellectual climate which nourished men of letters.

In this volume Willey is throughout more *committed* than he was in the earlier two: he speaks not only as a scholar and a student of the history of ideas but as a man concerned about civilization who is looking for usable points of view. This accounts both for its virtues and its defects, though it should be said at once that the former outweigh the latter. It accounts for the strenuously maintained point of view which enables him to shake a message out of, and pass implicit judgment on, each one of the figures he discusses; it also gives him the more valuable ability to listen carefully to what the writer he is discussing is saying, to make sure he understands what he is getting



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at and appreciates the problem he is trying to solve. These two aspects of the book sometimes get in the way of each other—particularly, it seems to me, in the discussion of Coleridge on imagination and fancy, perhaps the least convincing section of the book—but that may be inevitable where the critic is both trying to be sympathetic with his subjects and implicitly developing a position of his own.

Willey gave us the clue to his point of view as long ago as 1934, in the opening pages of *The Seventeenth Century Background*. Discussing "the rejection of scholasticism" and weighing the advantages and disadvantages of the modern "scientific" attitude which took its place, he there remarked:

> There can be no return, I believe, to the specific thought-forms of scholasticism, but we are once more asking the fundamental questions. As soon as we try to live more wholly and more deeply we become aware of all that experiment and observation leave untouched. We must ask "What," "Whence," and "Why"; we differ from St. Thomas mainly in having no direct replies to give. All we can do is to reply in terms of "As If"; "live according to the best hypotheses (whatever they may be)," thus runs our reply to the questioner, "live thus, and see if you can live the hypotheses into 'truths' (truths for yourself, that is)."

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Choose the "best" hypothesis and "live it into truth"—by doing this you can free yourself from the destructive effects of science on religion, for then the only proof your religion needs is the way it works out in living. Thus Willey sees Coleridge as having prepared in advance a complete solution to the problem which was so to worry the Victorians, by insisting that religious belief is not the result of rational demonstration ("*Evidences* of Christianity!" he quotes from Coleridge. "I am weary of the word. Make a man feel the want of it . . . and you may safely trust it to its own Evidences") but of an effort of the will. The truth of religion has nothing to do with demonstrations of the literal truth of the Bible or of the historicity of the Christian story; it is true if, adopting a philosophy of *als ob*, you proceed as though it were true and the results are emotionally satisfying.

If this attitude is central in Coleridge's thought—and it is doubtful if it is as central as Professor Willey makes it—then all the agonizing of Tennyson and others was irrelevant. Religion was forever free from the threats of science, and the elaborate compromises and substitutions prepared by Carlyle or Mill or Comte or Arnold become unnecessary. These compromises and substitutions are well described by Willey: he does excellently even with such figures as Comte and George Eliot, who are very far indeed from the Coleridge-Willey position, and he is both just and affectionate toward Matthew Arnold. Yet the *credo ut intelligas* position which he implicitly maintains throughout makes Newman more of a hero than Arnold and threatens the whole humanist position which he describes so carefully.

Even Willey cannot really show that the nineteenth century bothered itself unnecessarily with the problems posed by the relations between religion and science. We cannot help feeling that the position he ascribes to Coleridge and elaborates with such sympathy, the view that, to put it crudely, you can believe anything you like if it gives you emotional satisfaction, is full of dangers and can lead sometimes to *Mein Kampf*; and Willey's discussion of the efforts of those Victorians who strove to build a humanistic creed is itself sufficient evidence that they were not in fact embarked on an unnecessary adventure.

Nevertheless, this is a perceptive and thoughtful book. It is at once a contribution to the modern revaluations of conservatism (as in Peter Viereck's *Conservatism Revisited*), a contribution to the perennial science-religion question, and a carefully sympathetic study of some important nineteenth-century writers. It will be of equal interest therefore to the serious student of literature and of ideas and to the thoughtful general reader. DAVID DAICHES

David Daiches, author of A Study of Literature for Readers and Critics, is professor of English and chairman of the Division of Literature at Cornell University.

THE HONORABLE GERMAN

THE GERMAN CATASTROPHE: Reflections and Recollections, by Friedrich Meinecke. Translated by Sidney B. Fay (Harvard University Press; $3).

THIS WORK by the distinguished German historian was first published in 1946 when Germany's life seemed to have come to a standstill and her future was utterly in doubt. Above and beyond its content, the book was greeted as a sign that, despite the moral and physical devastation of the Nazi regime, the honorable traditions of German thought had not entirely ceased to exist. The now published English translation is not likely to have the same reception. It will be read for its explicit message rather than for its symbolic value. What does the dean of living German historians have to say about the shame of his nation?

Meinecke selects as "of inner and more permanent significance" for the understanding of Germany's downfall some problems that have interested him throughout his career. Uppermost among them is the problem of authority and freedom in modern society or, as he sometimes calls it, the problem of power and culture, of force and intellect, of "the things of the state and the things of the spirit." He sees the growth of Europe's population as the basic cause of the cultural and political transformation in the nineteenth century. The rise of nationalism, imperialism and socialism, the gains of authoritarian control, were phenomena common to the West and, he thinks, in the last analysis traceable

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to the pressure of an unprecedented population increase. It gave imperialism its popular appeal and led to World War I.

The socialism that came to power in Germany in 1918 took "a more lower-middle-class direction" than it did in Russia. It was moderate, democratic, and renounced the imperialistic aims of the nationalistic bourgeoisie. It failed because it was incapable of harnessing its great adversary, nationalism. The union between these two most vital and antagonistic social forces was finally achieved under National Socialism, but with devastating consequences for the individual and for the culture.

Meinecke is eager to make us understand the degeneration that permitted the state to fall into Hitler's hands. There were, he thinks, essential, long-range tendencies at work, but there was also the element of chance. Essential factors were the Prussian tradition of militarism and the ever growing pressures toward conformity. Anti-Semitism had brutalized segments of the middle class and discredited liberal ideas, and socialism unwittingly helped collectivize the masses. But accidents also played a role in Hitler's rise to power, be it the "chance personalities" of Hindenburg and Schleicher, or the absence of a few members whose votes would have prevented the nationalists from dropping Brüning. The conviction that history did not necessarily have to happen exactly as it did should give courage to face the future, Meinecke feels; it should also absolve the German people of at least some responsibility for having brought Hitler to power.

The significance of Meinecke's testament—for so we must consider the book of the octogenarian—can certainly not be found in any original contributions to recent German history. It lies rather in the conclusions the author draws from the critical review of the past, including his own former beliefs. If Meinecke is at all representative of what is left of German liberal culture, the differences between German and Western liberalism remain considerable. Despite his honest searching for truth and catharsis, his *Weltanschauung* remains steeped in authoritarian thinking. The balance he wants to strike between "the things of the state and the things of the spirit" shows how little the admirer of Scharnhorst, Boyen and Bismarck has been able to change his way of thinking. He deplores the loss of "the educational influence of the state upon the coming generation" (by the abolition of military service after the Versailles Treaty); even the Hitler Youth organizations "embodied the pedagogical idea of having the state satisfy a natural need on the part of youth through arrangements for physical exercise and for molding the mind."

Not uncritical of German militarism, he nevertheless bows to its "undoubtedly high moral qualities," to its "iron sense of duty, the ascetic strictness in service, the disciplining of the character in general." The anti-Semitism of the eighties was in his opinion at least partly brought on by "the Jews, who were inclined to enjoy indiscreetly the favorable economic situation now smiling upon them," just as, under Weimar, "among those who drank too hastily and greedily of the cup of power which had come to them were many Jews." He ranks Heinrich von Treitschke among the cultural administrators of "the sacred heritage of the Goethe period" and sees in Friedrich Naumann's national socialism "a wonderful attempt to bring together in an exceedingly rich synthesis both the most spiritual and the most practical and realistic elements in the German people." Naumann, needless to say, developed and propagandized the idea of social imperialism and became a spokesman of German annexationism in World War I.

These illustrations are not chosen to shed doubt on the author's integrity and genuine concern for the future of human dignity and cultural order. They should only show more clearly that, although he uses many concepts in common with Anglo-American liberal thought, his understanding of their content is basically different. Our deep respect for Meinecke, the scholar and the man, cannot prevent us from realizing that what appears to him the central problem of culture could better be called the task of manipulating the mass society.

PAUL W. MASSING

Paul Massing is a lecturer in the Department of Sociology at Rutgers University. His book, Rehearsal for Destruction, *is reviewed in this issue of the* New Republic. *During the Hitler regime he wrote under the penname of Karl Billinger.*

THEATRE

Bali Hai

THE THEATRE PUBLIC today wants to get away from it all. It wants to land on some magic isle, like the pink and purple spot on "South Pacific"—Bali Hai—where wondrous things may happen. It wants to forget the universal Woolworths of its life and of most stage and screen entertainment. As Baudelaire said long ago, our public wants to go "anywhere out of this world."

This explains the change of mood I wrote about here some weeks ago, which makes it possible for the not-well-made plays to become the season's reigning successes. It is to be noted that most of these plays lack definiteness of detail. In "The Cocktail Party," for instance, the "saint's" martyrdom is somewhat mythical, just as the sanatorium (or church) to which she attaches herself is of no specific denomination. In Gian-Carlo Menotti's "musical drama," "The Consul," the political

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refugee whose family seeks a visa (to America, I suppose?) belongs to no identifiable party, and is a citizen of no recognizable country, so that we never learn against what type of government he is in rebellion or on whose behalf.

"The Consul" is a great success. It is a success because people are moved by it in an ambiguous way which might vaguely be called social, as "The Cocktail Party" is vaguely religious. The tone of "The Cocktail Party" is debonair, elegantly philosophic and fashionably poetic. The tone of "The Consul" is theatrically pathetic, vibrantly topical, vehemently humane. It is not safe to ask too many questions about either. One ought to be satisfied that both plays provide unusual evenings.

Menotti is a sympathetic artist. He is honestly and honorably ambitious—naïve in his feeling, shrewd in his showmanship. He was sired by Puccini out of Mascagni or Leoncavallo. His ambition is to marry the warm spirit of his forebears to that of the rather ungrateful brood of the American musical theatre. He wants to be as vividly popular as his antecedents. The Broadway theatregoing audience is stirred by his work because it has accommodated the melodrama of latter-day Italian opera to themes that appear thoroughly up-to-date and sufficiently American. Menotti's themes are clever, and the operatic language (if not always operatic convention) has always been theatrically sound. He has succeeded in selling opera to Broadway.

If one were to point out that Menotti's music in "The Consul" is inferior to that of its models, that the play (in which all the protagonists perish) is rather primitive in construction and writing as well as uncertain in ideology—since all it says is what a pity people can't get to go anywhere they want to without the interference of bureaucratic folderol (considerations of political ties are disregarded), one would only give offense and be set down as heartless and mean. The fact is that the audience is made to cry, and it wants to cry—just as in Menotti's "The Medium" (which has a better story and better tunes) the people who sought solace in the medium's ministrations were not to be talked out of their comfort even when the medium herself confessed that her art was fraudulent.

I believe the best defense of "The Consul" is the lowbrow one which insists that for most audiences the show proves effective. I am a little more skeptical of the argument that it will open the road to further experiments in the field. If a more sophisticated or difficult musical drama is written, it will probably encounter the resistance usually accorded difficult drama and, more specially, difficult music.

"The Consul" is well produced, and has an extremely good cast. My favorites are Patricia Neway, impressive in voice and countenance, as the devoted wife; Maria Marlo, with a sweet pathos, as the Foreign Woman; George Jongeyans, warm and friendly in his dignity; Leon Lishner, whose sinister demeanor as Chief Police Agent scared me more than Scarpia ever does in "Tosca."

As for "The Wisteria Trees," a new American play by Joshua Logan based on—in very small print—"The Cherry Orchard," I can only declare myself dumbfounded. It made almost no impression on me at all. I could not even grow indignant over what my neighbor called "Southern Fried Chekhov." I saw that what was being attempted was a parallel with the situation and characters of the Russian play in terms of our post-bellum South, but I did not feel anything Russian, American or Southern about them at all. The play has no people. The characters in "Mister Roberts" (Logan's other comedy) are types, and we are amused in our recognition of them; in "South Pacific" (Logan's musical) the characters are Mary Martin and Ezio Pinza—which is plenty; but in "The Wisteria Trees" even Helen Hayes seems not only miscast but denatured, and none of the other members of the good cast is able to bring the play to life. The reason, I presume, is that "The Wisteria Trees" is a memory of a memory of a memory. The ladies wear pretty clothes, the setting is attractive, but all the rest is of a sentimentality so fabricated and so faded that it cannot sustain the play.

HAROLD CLURMAN

ON THE AIR: The Guinea Pigs

THERE HAVE BEEN many suggestions, in the last 25 years, about the possibility of establishing in the United States a "Radio TVA." All such plans envisaged some sort of guinea-pig operation that might act as a yardstick against which private broadcasting enterprise could be measured. Some of the notions have been purely romantic—like the idea that a bill putting the government into the broadcasting business could even get itself introduced in Washington, let alone liberate itself from the clutches of some committee.

There have been more realistic approaches. I once made a modest proposal myself—the establishment of a single broadcast station (not a network) by a public body organized along commercial lines but with shares owned by groups representing listeners, consumers, broadcasters, labor, etc. Nothing concrete has been done about any of the dreams, but now it turns out that a guinea-pig operation is actually in business. It consists of two parts. Nationally, the job is being done by the United Nations Radio. Locally, in more than 50 communities, the way is being shown by non-commercial stations clustered around the National Association of Educational Broadcasters.

UN Radio is acting as radio's conscience. I have just listened to two more of its programs. One was Norman Corwin's "Document A/777," over the Mutual Network, dealing with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This show was radio at its most brilliant. Nobody but the UN dares these days to use network radio unashamedly for the purpose of selling responsible civic thinking in the most dramatic terms. The UN shows are unapologetic propaganda. Foremost in their planning is the idea. Only after the propaganda line has been nailed down is any attention given to dramatic and production values. Then, nothing is stinted. In the casting of his "Document A/777," Corwin lined up a Hollywood galaxy bright enough to cop a dozen "Oscars." But the stars

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were incidental to the story, though they were directed to the hilt. I believe that "Document A/777," done by a high-school group, with the physical-education teacher supplying the musical bridges on a tinny piano, would produce almost as much fervor as Corwin got out of his hour on Mutual from one of the best radio studios in Hollywood. The feeling and the drama were in the script because the writer had started out with an arresting idea and a determination to tell his story come Hell or Hooper.

On its NBC series, the United Nations did a half-hour show called "Tomorrow for Two." The script was by one of the very best of the younger radio writers in this country, an enthusiastic fellow named Alan E. Sloane whose dialogue often sounds like the talk of a heart-of-gold newspaper reporter straight out of Ben Hecht.

A few weeks earlier, over Mutual, Sloane had done an hour program called "Eleven Memory Street," which told the story of the search for a Polish child whom the Nazis had kidnaped and who was finally returned to her home through the work of the International Refugee Organization. Sloane had worked on that show two years, recording the actual voices of all the people involved, including the little girl and her mother, the IRO officials and staff members, and the ex-Nazi who insisted that the child belonged in his custody. It was a magnificent "actuality" show, done with artistry and imagination. The only "unnatural" element, employed to heighten effect, was Lan Adomian's music, which blended every detail of Sloane's recital. This big job finished, Sloane tackled "Tomorrow for Two." Here, so far as script was concerned, he fell on his face; the story was hackneyed, with a Sunday-school quality about it. Yet "Tomorrow" emerged from the loudspeaker far superior to most of the network stuff listed under the drama rubric.

The secret of "Tomorrow's" impact, since the script was weak, was the production given it by Canada's Mavor Moore (it originated over one of the CBC's stations in Toronto), the superb acting of a pair of young Canadians whose names were new to me (John Drainie and Dianne Foster), the music by a young Canadian composer, Louis Applebaum (he had been in Hollywood, where he did the scores for "G.I. Joe" and "Tomorrow the World"), and the directing of Gerald Kean, who came up from Lake Success for the job. But all these artists could have done nothing with this particular show if it had not possessed the honest purpose that motivates all UN programs.

Maybe the UN's type of radio is the answer to our prayers for an American guinea-pig operation. Certainly, it has standards that any of the networks—and they all profess interest in responsible broadcasting—might copy. But if Lake Success is foreign territory to the networks, I suggest that they look toward Ames, Iowa; Ann Arbor, Michigan; Madison, Wisconsin; Syracuse, New York; and several dozen other educational centers where efforts are being made to use radio—and television too—to enrich the lives of the listeners.

At Ames, Iowa State College is now running the only educational (*i.e.*, licensed for non-commercial purposes) television station in the country. At Syracuse, the University has built a TV studio and contracted with the town's newest commercial outfit, WSYR-TV, to feed at least three hours of live programming per week, as a start. In Urbana, the University of Illinois has just decided to expand its activities beyond AM and FM radio into television. New FM stations have gone on the air in the last couple of months at the University of Alabama and at Duquesne. In Boston, the Lowell Institute Coöperative Broadcasting Council is producing "pure" educational programs —"Introductory Psychology," "History of Civilization," "Economics for the Citizen," etc.—and feeding them to established stations, AM as well as FM.

The old-fashioned AM radio isn't dead; even FM is kicking up plenty of kilocycles; and TV need not be abandoned to Milton Berle. The experimental work, without being precious or *avant-garde*, is actually on the air. If audiences neglect the good material that's available, and despair of getting more of it from the commercial studios, they play into the hands of the radio-TV bourbons. SAUL CARSON

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